



Security Council

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Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

Seventeenth report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. Since my previous report, restoring the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) to their full and effective implementation has remained elusive. The United States of America has not returned to the Plan, nor has it lifted or waived the unilateral sanctions reimposed after its withdrawal on 8 May 2018. It has also not extended the waivers with regard to the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran has not reversed any of the steps away from its nuclear-related commitments that it had taken since 8 May 2019, following the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan. I again urge participants in the Plan and the United States to pursue all available avenues for dialogue and cooperation.

2. In a letter dated 3 June 2024 addressed to the President of the Security Council and me (S/2024/429), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland noted that “Iran’s nuclear escalation has hollowed out the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, significantly reducing its non-proliferation value”. The Permanent Representatives observed that the “extensive violations of its Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action commitments”, including with regard to enrichment levels, overall enriched uranium stockpile and manufacture and the use of advanced centrifuges by the Islamic Republic of Iran, had made a return to full and effective implementation of the Plan more difficult. The Permanent Representatives underlined that the current context was concerning given the upcoming termination of resolution 2231 (2015) in October 2025. Nonetheless, the Permanent Representatives noted their continued commitment to a diplomatic solution to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

3. The Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a letter dated 5 June 2024 addressed to me (S/2024/439), reiterated that the steps taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran to reduce its nuclear commitments following the withdrawal of the United States, were taken in compliance with the terms of the Plan. He also refuted the claim that France, Germany and the United Kingdom have consistently upheld their commitments under the Plan, noting that they have failed to honour their sanctions-lifting commitments related to Transition Day. He further noted that the concern expressed by France, Germany and the United Kingdom regarding the termination of resolution 2231 (2015) was “misleading, irrelevant and provocative” and reaffirmed the commitment of the Islamic Republic of Iran to diplomacy.



4. In its most recent report,¹ the International Atomic Energy Agency reiterated that its Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action-related verification and monitoring “has been seriously affected by the cessation of Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments” under the Plan. The Agency noted that it had not been able to verify the total stockpile of enriched uranium in the Islamic Republic of Iran since February 2021, but it estimated that, as at 11 May 2024, the total stockpile of enriched uranium was 6,201.3 kg (which exceeds the 202.8 kg limit), including 781.3 kg enriched to 20 per cent uranium 235 and 144.1 kg enriched to 60 per cent uranium 235. The Agency further reported that it had not been able to perform Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action verification and monitoring activities in relation to centrifuge production and inventory for more than three years and had lost continuity of knowledge as a result.

5. The present report provides an assessment of the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) since the issuance of my sixteenth report ([S/2023/975](#)) on 15 December 2023. Consistent with previous reports, the focus of the present report is on the remaining restrictive measures related to nuclear-related transfers and activities, contained in paragraph 2 of annex B to the resolution.

II. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions

6. Since 15 December 2023, no new proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) have been submitted to and approved by the Security Council through the procurement channel. The Security Council has received 14 new notifications in the reporting period pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) for certain nuclear-related activities consistent with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that do not require approval, but do require a notification to the Council or both the Council and the Joint Commission.

7. The decision to renew waivers with respect to certain nuclear non-proliferation projects foreseen in the Plan and the nuclear-related provisions in annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) is under review by the United States.²

III. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)

8. The Secretariat has continued to support the work of the Security Council, in close cooperation with the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). It has also continued to liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on matters related to the procurement channel.

¹ See the Agency’s report of 27 May 2024.

² The waivers were intended to cover operations, training and services related to Unit 1 of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant; the transfer of enriched uranium out of the Islamic Republic of Iran in exchange for natural uranium; the transfer into the Islamic Republic of Iran of enriched uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor and the transfer out of the Islamic Republic of Iran of nuclear fuel scrap and spent nuclear fuel; the transfer, warehousing or other appropriate storage outside of the Islamic Republic of Iran of Iranian heavy water; the preparation and modification of the Fordow facility; and the modernization of the Arak reactor.