

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
30 June 2023

Original: English

**Letter dated 30 June 2023 from the Security Council Facilitator
for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the
President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit herewith, as agreed among the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), my six-month report on the implementation of the resolution, which covers the period from 13 December 2022 to 30 June 2023.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vanessa **Frazier**
Security Council Facilitator
for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)



Fifteenth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

I. Introduction

1. The note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44) sets forth the practical arrangements and procedures for the Council in carrying out tasks related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), particularly with respect to the provisions specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 of annex B to that resolution.
2. According to the note, the Security Council should select, on an annual basis, one member to serve as its Facilitator for the functions specified therein. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the note, and after consultations among the members of the Council, I was appointed as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for the period ending 31 December 2023 (see S/2023/2).
3. It was also established in the note that the Facilitator should brief the other members of the Security Council on its work and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) every six months, in parallel with the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution.
4. The present report covers the period from 13 December 2022 to 30 June 2023.

II. Summary of the activities of the Council in the “2231 format”

5. On 15 December 2022, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations sent a letter addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2022/962), in which he outlined the views of the Islamic Republic of Iran with regard to the fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2022/912), as described further in paragraph 9 of the present report.
6. On 19 December 2022, the Security Council was briefed (see S/PV.9225 and SC/15147) by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on the fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2022/912), by my predecessor as Facilitator on the work of the Council and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2022/937), and by the Chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, on the procurement channel (S/2022/919).
7. On 30 June 2023, the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) met in the “2231 format” and discussed the findings and recommendations of the fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution (S/2023/473).
8. During the reporting period, a total of 17 notes were circulated within the “2231 format”. In addition, a total of 11 official communications were sent to Member States and/or the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission. I received a total of 11 communications from Member States and the Coordinator.

III. Monitoring the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

9. In the above-mentioned letter dated 15 December 2022 (S/2022/962), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran outlined the views and observations of his country regarding the fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The letter contained eight points, in which the Permanent Representative noted, inter alia, that the Secretary-General's report "disregard[ed] fundamental factors contributing to the circumstances surrounding the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action", which was, "undeniably, the result of the United States' unilateral and illegal withdrawal of the Plan in flagrant violation of resolution 2231 (2015)". Further noting that the report contained "no mention of the new sanctions imposed by the United States" or "the ongoing economic consequences of current unilateral sanction regulations", the Permanent Representative stated that "when the harm caused to Iran is rectified, those steps will be reversed", as reflected in paragraph 4 of the report. These steps were "fully consistent" with paragraphs 26 and 36 of the Plan. In his letter, the Permanent Representative also recalled that the Islamic Republic of Iran "categorically rejects the allegations and disinformation contained in the report", including in paragraphs 8, 12 and 18–20.

10. During the reporting period, the Joint Commission did not convene. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action coordinator continued to consult with the participants of the Plan of Action and the United States of America on addressing developments regarding the Plan of Action, towards the possible return by the United States to the Plan, and to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Plan by all.

11. On 3 and 4 March 2023, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visited Tehran. The visit resulted in a joint statement with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The statement recognized that "positive engagements" could pave the path to "wider agreements" and outlined three specific points to "facilitate enhanced cooperation". As reported by the Director General, the process of implementing the activities set out in the joint statement has begun, and the process "needs to be sustained and uninterrupted in order that all the commitments contained therein are fulfilled".

12. In line with paragraph 4 of resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Security Council requested the Director General of IAEA to provide regular updates to the Council on the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and to report at any time on any issue of concern directly affecting the fulfilment of those commitments, the Director General submitted to the Agency's Board of Governors, and to the Council, regular reports on 28 February 2023 (S/2023/324) [GOV/2023/8] and 31 May 2023 [GOV/2023/24] on the Agency's verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution 2231 (2015).

13. In the above-mentioned reports, IAEA set out the Agency's view that, since 23 February 2021, its verification and monitoring activities in relation to the Plan of Action had been "seriously affected" as a result of the decision of the Islamic Republic of Iran to stop the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan of Action, including the Additional Protocol. In both reports, IAEA noted that "in the event of a full resumption of implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA", the Agency would "not be able to re-establish continuity of knowledge" and instead would "need to establish a new baseline" for verification and monitoring activities. As such, the Agency acknowledged that "work is needed to develop specific arrangements with Iran", including addressing gaps in

the continuity of knowledge and the provision of declarations and additional records. In its May report, IAEA underlined that, on 2 and 3 May 2023, the Agency installed surveillance cameras at workshops in Esfahan where centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows are manufactured.

14. In both reports, IAEA noted that the total enriched uranium stockpile of the Islamic Republic of Iran, based on information provided by the country, had increased from 3,760.8 kg to 4,744.5 kg – a total increase of 983.7 kg – with an estimated stockpile comprising 4,384.8 kg of uranium in the form of UF₆ as at 13 May 2023. In the May report, IAEA noted that, between 22 February and 19 March 2023, the Agency had been provided with “additional information and supporting operational data in relation to the presence at [the Fordow fuel enrichment plant] (FFEP) of particles enriched up to 83.7% U-235” by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and that “the Agency informed Iran that these findings were inconsistent with the level of enrichment of the UF₆ produced at FFEP, as declared by Iran”. That information and data were “independently evaluated” by the Agency with “its own verification results” and “using all the relevant available information and tools”. On 30 March 2023, IAEA, in a letter, stated that “on the basis of its evaluation”, it had assessed that “the information provided was not inconsistent with Iran’s explanation for the origin of these particles” and that the Agency had “no further questions on the matter at that stage”. On 1 February 2023, the Director General also provided an update ([S/2023/323](#)) [GOV/INF/2023/1] regarding a routine unannounced inspection at FFEP on 21 January 2023, and noted that, on 25 January 2023, the Islamic Republic of Iran had provided an updated document, post-facto, reflecting a new mode of operation. The Director General concluded that he was “concerned” at the “substantial change ... without informing the Agency in advance”, and that this was “inconsistent with Iran’s obligations under its Safeguards Agreement”.

Ballistic missiles and launches

15. In a letter dated 28 April 2023 ([S/2023/302](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran “continues to violate its international obligations, evidenced by launches of space launch vehicles with ballistic missile capabilities”. Specifically, he referred to the launch on 4 March 2023 of the “Nahid-1 satellite with the QAEM-100 space launch vehicle” by the Islamic Republic of Iran, in “clear violation of article 3 of annex B to Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)”.

16. In response to the above-mentioned letter, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a letter dated 3 May 2023 ([S/2023/317](#)), stated that his country “categorically rejects the unsubstantiated allegations made in the letter against it” and that its “missile and space programmes, including launches of ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles, fall outside of the purview or competence of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and its annexes”.

17. In a letter dated 23 May 2023 ([S/2023/373](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation stated that he deemed “politically biased and erroneous allegations about the Iranian space launch vehicles being ‘virtually identical’ to ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons as inadmissible”. Since “no viable information to the contrary” had been provided to the Security Council, his country would continue to proceed from its previous assessment that the Islamic Republic of Iran is “respecting in good faith the relevant call address[ed] to it in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)”.

18. In identical letters dated 30 May 2023 ([S/2023/390](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel expressed his “deep concern” regarding “launches of space launch vehicles with ballistic missile capabilities” by the Islamic Republic of Iran and

referred to the launch on 24 May 2023 of the “Khoramshar 4” missile, in “clear violation” of paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

19. In a letter dated 31 May 2023 ([S/2023/398](#)), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland reiterated their “deep concern” that these launches and tests, which were “inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)” and which followed activities outlined in their letters of November and December 2018, February, March and November 2019, June 2020, February and August 2021 and January, May and November 2022, constituted an “enduring trend” of Iran continuing to advance its ballistic missile capabilities, despite the provisions of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In addition, they reiterated their “great concern that all these missile launches and tests send a very destabilizing message to the region and beyond”.

20. In response to the identical letters dated 30 May 2023 from the Permanent Representative of Israel ([S/2023/390](#)) and the letter dated 31 May 2023 from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom ([S/2023/398](#)), the Chargé d'affaires of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in her letters dated 2 June 2023 ([S/2023/403](#) and [S/2023/404](#)), stated that her country “categorically rejects” the claims in the letters. She noted that her country’s missile and space programmes fully complied with international law, were within the country’s “legitimate rights” and “fall outside the purview and competence of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and its annexes”. She also emphasized that paragraph 3 of annex B was “unambiguous and requires no further interpretation”. She further stated that Iran was “(n)ever involved in any activity that violated resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)” and “objected to the arbitrary and misleading interpretations of paragraph 3 of annex B of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)”.

21. Further to his letter dated 23 May 2023 ([S/2023/373](#)), and in response to the letter dated 31 May 2023 from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom ([S/2023/398](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, in a letter dated 5 June 2023 ([S/2023/410](#)), reiterated his country’s principled position and noted the “faulty, legally and technically unsound assessments” regarding the activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran aimed at “shifting the blame for the current situation around the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action onto the Islamic Republic of Iran”. Noting that none of the existing international mechanisms “either directly or implicitly prohibit Iran from developing missile and space programmes”, and as “no viable information to the contrary” had been provided to the Security Council, his country would continue to proceed from its previous assessment that the Islamic Republic of Iran was “respecting in good faith the relevant call addressed to it in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)”.

22. In a letter dated 12 June 2023 ([S/2023/428](#)), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom brought to the attention of the Security Council “further actions recently undertaken by Iran” which were “inconsistent” with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Noting media reports of the unveiling on 6 June 2023 by the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran of “the Fattah” ballistic missile, the Permanent Representatives stated that such activity, and the activities outlined in their previous letters (see paragraph 18 above), “constitute an enduring trend of Iran to continue to advance its ballistic missile capabilities despite the provisions of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)” which “send a very destabilizing message to the region and beyond”.

23. In response to the abovementioned letter ([S/2023/428](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a letter dated 14 June 2023 ([S/2023/439](#)), stated that he “strongly rejects this unfounded claim” and “baseless allegations made” and reiterated his country’s position, as conveyed in its previous

letters. He reiterated that his country's "missile and space programmes are within Iran's legitimate rights and in full conformity with international law" and "fall outside the purview and competence" of the resolution and its annexes. He also noted that his country "strongly and persistently objected to the arbitrary and misleading interpretations of paragraphs 3 and 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015)".

24. The Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, in response to the abovementioned letter (S/2023/428), in a letter dated 14 June 2023 (S/2023/440), reiterated his country's "principled position" as noted in its previous communications dated 13 July, 29 November, 6 December and 7 December 2022, and 23 May and 5 June 2023. He emphasized that "false allegations about so-called 'violations' of resolution 2231 (2015)" were "lacking any legal and technical ground" and that the previous communications by France, the United Kingdom and Germany contained "erroneous logic and invalid arguments". Noting that, as "no viable information to the contrary has ever been provided to the Security Council", his country continued to proceed from its previous assessment that "Iran is respecting in good faith the relevant call addressed to it in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015)."

**Transfers related to ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles
(as defined in paragraph 4 of annex B)**

25. In a letter dated 17 January 2023 (S/2023/46), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated his "grave concern regarding the unethical behaviour of some Security Council members" who raised "politically motivated false allegations against other States Members of the United Nations" and "unfounded accusations against the Islamic Republic of Iran ... based solely on fabrications as well as wrong assumptions", referring to, in particular, the Security Council meeting held on 13 January 2023 (see S/PV.9243). He further noted that his country "categorically rejects" the claims made against it during that meeting.

26. In a letter dated 18 May 2023 (S/2023/362) and its annex, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom conveyed a "document setting out the relevant evidence", in which the transfers were noted as a "violation of paragraph 4 (a) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015)". This evidence included the seizure, on 23 February 2023, by *HMS Lancaster*, of "components for medium-range ballistic missiles" which the United Kingdom assessed had been "smuggled from Iran to the Houthis", as well as "two examples of Iranian one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles (Shahed-131 and Shahed-136) recovered from the battlefield in Ukraine" and loaned to the United Kingdom by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In her letter, the Permanent Representative invited the Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) Secretariat team to the United Kingdom to "consider all evidence of violations of resolution 2231 (2015)".

27. In a letter dated 22 May 2023 (S/2023/368), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom reiterated that they were "deeply concerned by the transfer of unmanned aerial vehicles from Iran to Russia", in violation of resolution 2231 (2015), as mentioned in their previous letter (S/2022/781). They further stated that they would welcome "an investigation by the United Nations Secretariat team responsible for monitoring the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)".

28. In response to the above-mentioned letters (S/2023/362 and S/2023/368), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, in a letter dated 23 May 2023 (S/2023/373), reiterated his country's principled position and condemned "the propagation of such false allegations" about the Islamic Republic of Iran "allegedly being in non-compliance with resolution 2231 (2015)". He further stated that "neither the letters, nor the document by the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom,

provides any credible evidence of so-called ‘violations’ of resolution 2231 (2015)” and were “limited to assumptions underpinned by certain ‘suspicions’ ... and ‘understandings’”. He also stated that the “attempt to give instructions to the Secretariat” was “in violation of paragraph 2 of Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations”.

29. In response to the letter dated 18 May 2023 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom (S/2023/362) and the letter dated 22 May 2023 from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (S/2023/368), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a letter dated 24 May 2023 (S/2023/376), stated that her country “categorically rejects ... the baseless accusations presented in the letters”, and reiterated that her country had “consistently adhered to the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) and has not engaged in any activity that violates this resolution”. She also noted that the “alleged and so-called evidence and documents” do not have “any legal validity”, “lack credibility” and “do not bear any indications linking them to the Islamic Republic of Iran”.

30. In a letter dated 9 June 2023 (S/2023/418) and its annex, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine shared “a document containing the relevant evidence on the supplies of the unmanned aerial vehicles of Iranian origin to the Russian Federation” as well as the “transfers of the unmanned aerial vehicles to the Russian Federation” by the Islamic Republic of Iran, in “flagrant violation” of paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), which were being used “against Ukraine”. He urged the international community to “reinforce joint efforts aimed at combatting uncontrolled transfers of these items”.

31. In response to that letter (S/2023/418), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a letter dated 12 June 2023 (S/2023/429), “strongly reject[ed] the baseless accusation by Ukraine” and reiterated his country’s “unequivocal and consistent position”. He noted that attempting to link the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and resolution 2231 (2015) was “misleading and entirely unfounded” and that the “so-called evidence in the letter” was “clearly flawed and lack[ed] credibility”.

32. In its letter dated 14 June 2023 (S/2023/440), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, regarding paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), noted that “all the relevant accusations, referring to some ‘assessments’ and ‘suspicions’ based on certain ‘open source’ information” were “not substantiated with any credible evidence” and “in no way can be regarded as substantive proofs of alleged ‘violations’” of the paragraph, as mentioned in its previous letter of 23 May 2023 (see para. 28 above).

33. The above-mentioned letters, addressed to the Secretary-General and/or the President of the Security Council, were circulated in the “2231 format” of the Council during the reporting period.

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

34. During the reporting period, no new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in document INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council.

35. Since Implementation Day, a total of 52 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been submitted to the Security Council by five Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of

Action. To date, of the 52 proposals that have been processed, 37 have been approved, 5 were not approved and 10 were withdrawn. On average, the proposals were processed through the procurement channel in 50 calendar days. After the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan of Action, the procurement channel continues to function, and the Joint Commission continues to stand ready to review proposals.

36. According to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), certain nuclear-related activities do not require approval but do require a notification to the Security Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission. In this regard, during the reporting period, 10 notifications were submitted to the Security Council in relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of equipment and technology covered by annex B, section 1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1, intended for light water reactors.

37. No notifications were submitted to the Security Council related to the necessary modification of the two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, and no notifications were submitted to the Council related to the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design.

38. On 27 June 2023, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to me the Group's fifteenth six-month report of the Joint Commission ([S/2023/479](#)) in accordance with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

V. Other approval and exemption requests

39. During the reporting period, no proposal was submitted by Member States to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

40. Exemptions to the assets freeze provisions are contained in paragraph 6 (d) of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). No exemption requests were received or granted by the Security Council in relation to the 23 individuals and 61 entities currently on the list maintained pursuant to the resolution.

VI. Transparency, outreach and guidance

41. As the Security Council's Facilitator, I am deeply committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as endorsed by the Council in its resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). I will seek to further facilitate, strengthen and promote the implementation of the resolution, as my predecessors did before me, and I firmly believe that dialogue, transparency and the utilization of the procurement channel remain critical for the present and the future. I note and welcome the active efforts by all Member States in promoting, supporting and engaging in dialogue and in acknowledging the importance of the Plan of Action as a multilateral agreement in nuclear non-proliferation. I encourage all of us to actively support this Plan.

42. Outreach activities by the Secretariat, as mandated by the note mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present report ([S/2016/44](#)), continued to foster awareness of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The website on the resolution, also managed and regularly updated by the Secretariat through the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, continues to provide relevant information.

43. In drafting the present report, numerous bilateral consultations with Member States and their representatives were held, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to discuss issues relevant to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In my role

as Facilitator, I advocate for the Security Council's collective responses to international peace and security issues, and I encourage the international community to act in line with paragraph 2 of the resolution, which calls upon all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to fully support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
